Evidence suggests that many Ebola infections are asymptomatic, 1,2 a factor overlooked by recent outbreak summaries and projections.
3 Partic ularly, results from one postEbola outbreak serosurvey 1 showed that 71% of seropositive individuals did not have the disease; another study 2 reported that 46% of asymptomatic close contacts of patients with Ebola were seropositive. Although asymptomatic infections are unlikely to be infec tious, 2 they might confer protective immunity and thus have important epidemiological consequences.
Although a forceful response is needed, forecasts that ignore naturally acquired immunity from asymptomatic infections overestimate incidence late in epidemics. We illustrate this point by comparing the projections of two simple models based on the Ebola epidemic in Liberia, a model that does not account for asymptomatic infections, and another that assumes 50% of infections are asymptomatic and induce protective immunity. In both models, the basic reproduction number (R 0 ) is identical and based on published estimates. 3 The figure shows the projected cumulative incidence through time. Although the initial outbreaks are almost identical, by Jan 10, the model without asymptomatic infections projects 50% more cumulative symptomatic cases than the model that accounts for asymptomatic infection. This difference arises because asymptomatic infection contributes to herd immunity and thereby dampens epidemic spread. W i d e s p r e a d a s y m p t o m a t i c immunity would likewise have implications for Ebola control measures and should be considered when planning intervention strategies. For instance, should a safe and effective vaccine become available, the vaccination coverage needed for elimination will depend on preexisting immunity in the population (appendix). Immunity resulting from asymptomatic infections should reduce the intervention effort needed to interrupt transmission but might also complicate the design and interpretation of vaccine trials. Trials and interventions are likely to target exactly those highrisk populations most likely to have been asymptomatically immunised. Thus, for assessment of vaccines and other countermeasures, baseline serum should be collected to improve both estimates of intervention effectiveness and our understanding of asymptomatic immunity. Additionally, assessment of intervention measures should account for the contribution of asymptomatic immunity in curbing epidemic spread.
Asymptomatic infection could also potentially be directly harnessed to mitigate transmission. If individuals who have cleared asymptomatic infections could be identified reliably, and if they are indeed immune to symptomatic reinfection, they could potentially be recruited to serve as caregivers or to undertake other highrisk disease control tasks, providing a buffer akin to that of ring vaccination. Recruitment of such individuals might be preferable to enlistment of survivors of symptomatic Ebola disease because survivors might experience psychological trauma or stigmatisation and be fewer in number-in view of the asymptomatic proportions suggested in previous studies 1,2 and the low survival rate of symptomatic cases.
3 Healthcare workers with natural immunity acquired from asymptomatic infection, if identified, could be allocated to care for acutely ill and infectious patients, minimising disease spread to susceptible healthcare workers. 
